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Abstract   
This research is concerned with the trend towards commodification of forestry, in the context 
of community forest governance for sustainable development in the tropics. In these contexts, 
commodification takes different forms, including sales of certified timbers and sales of 
carbon credits. In addition to the general aim to enhance income, these market-based forestry 
interventions typically aim to align with sustainable development agendas, including  a) 
safeguarding ecological integrity and b) promoting poverty alleviation. Our concern here is 
that the process of forest commodification might lead to a shift in local norms of benefit-
sharing, in ways that can hinder these key components of sustainable development goals. We 
report the results of a survey (N=519) conducted across sites in Bolivia, China and Tanzania 
that shows that switching from non-monetary to monetary benefits is associated with  
changes in preferences for distributional fairness in ways that may be detrimental to the poor. 
In particular, we show that forest commodification is associated with a lower likelihood of  of 
selecting pro-poor or egalitarian approaches to benefit sharing and higher  likelihood of 
selecting to distribute benefits in a way that rewards individual contributions or compensates 
losses.  
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Introduction   
In Antigone, the character Creon claims that ‘There’s nothing in the world so demoralising as 
money’ whilst D.H Lawrence observed that ‘Money poisons you when you’ve got it, and 
starves you when you haven’t’ (Lawrence, 1994 [1928]). Most academic research into this 
phenomena focuses on the institutional arrangements surrounding monetary exchange, 
identifying market exchange as a driver of declining social responsibility (Polanyi, 1944, Falk 
and Szech, 2013, Bartling et al., 2014, Sandel, 2012, Satz, 2010). More recently, evidence has 
emerged that money itself – indeed even brief exposure to an image or symbol of money – 
can erode our empathy and responsibility towards others (Caruso et al., 2013, Vohs et al., 
2006, Kouchaki et al., 2013). In the context of environmental conservation, this raises 
concern because virtues associated with social responsibility, including compassion, 
reciprocity, trust and cooperation, are often essential requirements for successful 
environmental governance (Ostrom, 1990) and are also widely held to be central 
requirements - or capabilities - for achieving human wellbeing (Nussbaum, 2011). To put this 
in a way that has underpinned mainstream environmentalism for at least three decades, social 
equity is a necessary condition for achieving sustainable development (WCED, 1987, Pearce 
et al., 1989, Holden et al., 2017).  
 Our particular interest in this paper is the commodification of forests within the context of 
community forestry in the tropics. Communities are increasingly supported to develop 
money-based forest economies through what are generically termed market-based 
instruments (MBIs). In our case locations, these include the marketing of forest timbers 
through forest certification and labelling schemes, payments for ecosystem services (PES) 
schemes for carbon offsetting and soil stabilisation and development of ecotourism products.  
Whilst we adopt the convention of collectively describing these as ‘market-based’, many PES 
schemes involve government or NGO procurement in the absence of competitive market 
institutions (Gómez-Baggethun and Muradian, 2015, Calvet-Mir et al., 2015, Ferraro, 2009, 
Milne and Adams, 2012). What defines MBIs in this research is therefore the progression 
from non-monetary to monetary benefits from managing local forests. This change is often 
associated with a shift in the kind of goods and services that are valued and exploited.  For 
example, the United Nations’ programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (REDD+) has newly valorised the carbon stored in forest biomass as a 
basis for paying forest managers in the tropics for conserving or enhancing their forest stock 
(Corbera, 2012).  
The commodification of local forest economies has the potential to bring important new 
income streams to local communities and to incentivise forest conservation over conversion 
to other land uses. However, there are concerns about how well such development and 
conservation objectives are being met. For example, reviews find that there is currently  
insufficient evidence to conclude that these objectives have been widely achieved  in practice 
by either certification schemes (Blackman and Rivera 2011, Romero et al. 2013) or PES 
schemes (Börner et al., 2017, Samii et al., 2014, Muradian et al., 2013).  But critiques of 
MBIs go beyond concerns about effectiveness, to include fears that commodification of 
environmental stewardship erodes the moral basis for caring, both for nature and for other 
people. Previous research has found that MBIs can foster mentalities in which inequitable 
distribution of costs and benefits are conceived as acceptable (Caney, 2010, O’Neill, 2016, 
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Spash, 2010) and in which monetary incentives crowd out superior motives for caring for 
nature (García-Amado et al., 2013, Bowles, 2008, Agrawal et al., 2015, Bolderdijk et al., 
2013, Rode et al., 2015, Corbera, 2012, Sandel, 2012, Neuteleers and Engelen, 2015).  
This paper adds to this literature through field-based empirical research into the effects of 
forest commodification on principles of fairness within local communities. In particular, we 
investigate whether commodification changes conceptions of fairness in ways that appear to 
diminish concern about poverty and inequality. In line with the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) we assume that both the prioritisation of the poorest and the 
pursuit of equality (e.g. ‘leave no one behind’) are important conditions for progress towards 
sustainable development. If commodification of forests is diminishing the salience of these 
norms, this might be a hindrance to progress towards sustainable development.  
 
Our focus here is on the conceptions of fairness held within local communities. This is 
increasingly pertinent for the governance of forest resources because of the increasing 
proportion of forests in low and middle income countries that are coming under forms of 
community management (Larson et al., 2017). We investigate the effects on fairness 
preferences of a) monetary versus non-monetary benefits, b) societal context and c) 
individual characteristics.  
 
Figure 1: Hypothesised factors affecting preferred fairness principles 
 
We explore three hypotheses about how individual moral preferences might be predicted by 
different types of independent variables (Figure 1). Firstly, addressing the primary research 
interest of this paper, we propose that conceptions of distributional and procedural fairness 
are both plural and dynamic (Walzer, 2008) and that the preferred conceptions in a given 
situation will be shaped by the nature of the benefit, i.e. whether it is monetary or non-
monetary. For many of us it is intuitive that we apply different principles of distributional 
fairness according to the nature of the good being distributed: we might for example think 
that ‘need’ is the fairest principle for distributing food, ‘equality’ the fairest way to distribute 
votes and perhaps ‘merit’ as the best way to allocate jobs (Deutsch, 2011). More specific to 
our hypothesis, there is a body of evidence from experimental psychology that suggests that 
being primed to think about money induces a distinct normative response (Vohs, 2015). 
Whilst our primary interest is in the effect of monetisation, we also expect contexts of place 
to have an important bearing on social moralities. Our second hypothesis is therefore that 
Fairness 
principles for 
distributing 
forest 
benefits
Type of Benefit
(money vs goods)
Societal Contexts
(location, culture)
Individual 
Characteristics 
(gender, age, 
education, 
wealth)
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conceptions of fairness will be shaped by the societal context in which the decision is to be 
taken. Here, we are following literature that suggests that cultural, economic, political and 
legal contexts are not only shaped by ethical values, but also  play a role in shaping the 
salience of different principles of fairness (Almås et al., 2016, Haidt, 2012, Miller, 2013, 
Saucier et al., 2015). Thirdly, we propose that individual characteristics and circumstances 
will similarly shape conceptions of fairness, as some research has found for gender and age 
(Ruegger and King, 1992), education (Hungerford and Volk, 1990) and economic wealth 
(Armantier, 2006, Zhang and Yu, 2018). 
 
Methods 
We compare how monetary and non-monetary benefits from local forests effect judgments 
about distributional and procedural fairness for villagers in four cultural groups across three 
countries: i) Monkox indigenous territory in Lomerio, Bolivia, ii) Han villages, China, iii) 
ethnic minority (Lisu and  Dai) villages, China and iv) Tanzanian villages in Kilwa district. 
We investigate villagers’ views about fairness, both in terms of principles for distributing 
forest benefits, and procedures for deciding this. We survey 519 respondents using a form 
(Supplementary Information) translated into local language and conducted face to face with 
in-country research team members.  
Faced with the scenario of material benefits arising from community forests, all respondents 
were asked to rank, in order of preference, a) alternative distributional principles and b) 
alternative institutional arrangements for decision-making. Distributional principles were 
based on well-established philosophical approaches to defining fair distribution, including 
those that argue that fairness is best pursued by prioritising need, equality, utility 
maximisation or desert (how deserving a person is) (Miller, 1999). Applying these different 
ethical traditions to the context of forest governance, we generated five alternative 
distributional principles: 1. Prioritise the poorest (‘Pro-poor’), 2. Distribute equally 
(‘Equality’), 3. Invest to generate greatest collective benefit (‘Invest’), 4. Prioritise those who 
experience losses arising from forest conservation (‘Compensate’), 5. Reward those who 
have contributed to forest conservation (‘Reward’). Views about procedural fairness were 
investigated in much the same way, but with four alternative arrangements for decision-
making authority: 1. Village leaders, 2. Village assembly, 3. District government and 4. Non-
government partner (in China this was private sector forest companies; in Tanzania and 
Bolivia, non-profit organisations). 
Both sets of principles have been adapted from sets that we developed and tested during 
earlier research in Rwanda, Uganda and Laos (Martin, 2017) and thus we are confident that 
they are well understood by respondents,  that they do not omit any widely preferred 
principles and that they are appropriate for this new research question about effects of 
commodification. However, with both sets of statements there are variations of meaning 
between countries that we acknowledge may have some bearing on comparisons. Firstly, as 
we will mention in the discussion, the distributional statement for ‘Reward’ had a somewhat 
unique interpretation in Bolivia. In all other sites, we found this statement to be understood as 
referring to those who helped out in the day to day management activities of forests, 
including guard patrols, boundary marking etc.. In Bolivia it was understood in more 
strategic, leadership terms, as referring to elders who had fought to secure territorial rights. 
Secondly, the procedural statement about non-governmental partners was interpreted in 
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Tanzania and Bolivia as referring to non-government organisations who were supporting 
local forestry initiatives whereas in Chinese sites there was no such NGO presence and it 
referred instead to private sector forest contractors. 
 
To test the first hypothesis (the effect of benefit type) we employed two versions of our 
survey. One version (monetary) defined the benefit as cash income from sale of forest 
benefits, whilst the other (non-monetary version) defined the benefit to be shared as the forest 
benefits themselves. In other words, the monetary version imagines that there has been cash 
payment (e.g. from sale of timber) and asks respondents how that money should be 
distributed; in contrast, the non-monetary version imagines that forest benefits (e.g. 
construction materials or fruits) are to be distributed directly. Each site level sample was 
randomly split so that half the respondents used the monetary version and half the non-
monetary version. To test the second hypothesis (the effect of societal contexts) we selected 
respondents from different locations, across three countries and four cultural groups. To test 
the third hypothesis (the effect of individual characteristics) we collected basic profile 
information about respondents (age, gender, education level and wealth). Wealth was 
measured by proxy, using a simple count of selected durable assets, a method that has been 
found to adequately correlate with more research intensive measures of income or 
expenditure (Morris et al., 2000).   
 
Sites were selected in locations where the team already worked and could take advantage of 
established trust and successful local partnership. They were selected not to be representative 
of the regions or countries where they are situated, but to provide contextual difference, 
especially in relation to culture. In all sites, there is some form of community forestry in 
operation, meaning that communities themselves have some responsibility for local benefit 
sharing and therefore that local norms of distribution are important. In Tanzania, we selected 
two villages (Ruhatwe and Kikole) in Kilwa district, an economically poor part of the country 
with high dependence on natural resources. These villages are seeing a progression towards 
market exchange for forest goods, through sales of Forest Stewardship Council certified 
timber under Participatory Forest Management and through carbon offsets generated by a 
REDD+ pilot project (Corbera et al., 2017). In Bolivia, we worked with communities within 
the indigenous territory (Territorios Indigena Originario Campesino) of Lomerio, an area of 
256,000 hectares that has been legally owned by the Monkox people since 2006. As with the 
Tanzanian sites, there have been moves towards community- and market-based forestry, in 
this case through Rainforest Alliance ‘Smartwood’ forest certification and subsequent NGO 
mediated commercial partnerships between communities and private contractors (McDaniel, 
2003, De Pourcq et al., 2009, Martin, 2017). Of 29 communities in Lomerio, we selected 4 
that were currently active in community forest operations (Palmira, Santo Rosario, San 
Lorenzo and Todos Santos). In China we selected sites representing some of the cultural 
diversity within Yunnan province. Baojiachun and Xinqi are Han Chinese settlements, the 
majority ethnic group. Shiba is a village of the Lisu people whilst Manhong is settled by 
another ethnic minority group, the Dai people. All Chinese sites had experienced some 
commodification of forest benefits through Payments for Ecosystem Services (the Sloping 
Land Conversion Programme) as well as more location-specific enterprises such as 
ecotourism (Baojiachun) and collective commercial forestry (Xinqi).  
 
Sampling strategies differed between countries (Table 1). In Bolivia community sizes were 
small and we selected one person from each household. In Tanzania we acquired lists of 
households from the 2012 census and randomly selected 60 households from each village. In 
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China we had to use convenience sampling but sought to reduce bias by ensuring different 
locations in the village were covered and that surveys took place across different days and 
times.  
Table 1. Survey sample 
Country  
 
Village Total 
population 
Survey 
sample 
Qualitative 
Interview 
Sample 
Participatory 
Video 
Tanzania  Ruhatwe 979 60 12 Yes Kikole 1490 60 12 Yes 
China  
Baojiachun 
(Han) 
5180 60 10 Yes 
Xinqi (Han) 4577 60 10 Yes 
Shiba (Lisu) 1901 60 10 No 
Manhong (Dai) 286 62 10 No 
Bolivia  
Palmira 391 50  
Focus 
Groups  
 
Yes 
(collective) 
San Lorenzo 333 50 
Santa Rosario 82 20 
Todos Santo  166 40 
 
Qualitative data collection involved participatory video and semi-structured interviews. 
Participatory videos (PVs) provided communities the opportunity to highlight local forest 
justice concerns of particular significance to them, in the absence of any substantial direction 
from the research team. In essence, this informed us about what really mattered in that time 
and place, providing a kind of benchmark of what might be prominent in people’s minds as 
they thought about issues of distribution and procedure. The main function of this 
information was to triangulate with survey findings, helping us to validate and make sense of 
key findings. PVs were made in Ruhatwe, Kikole, Baojiachun, Xinqi and Lomerio (in 
Lomerio, the communities collaborated over a shared film). Semi-structured interviews 
(focus groups in Bolivia) were conducted with a sub-sample of survey respondents and 
served a similar function, seeking to explain some of the differences recorded between 
locations and thereby strengthening our confidence in the main findings from the regression 
analysis.  
Survey data was analysed using econometric (regression) analysis to control for the potential 
confounding effects of many variables such as location, gender, age, education and wealth.  
We used ordered logits because the dependent variables are ordinal indicators and the tables 
of regression results report odds ratios.  The calculation of standard errors takes clustering at 
the village level into account. 
 
Results 
Factors affecting choices of distributional fairness principle  
The three sets of hypotheses outlined above are tested using regression analysis; specifically, 
ordered logits are used since each of the five distribution principles -  pro-poor, equality, 
invest, compensate and reward – are ranked from the least (1) to the most preferred (5).  
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These ranks are regressed on indicators of the monetary version, location of sites and 
individual characteristics of participants (gender, age, education and an index measuring 
household assets).  Table 2 presents the results. 
Table 2: Factors affecting distribution principles: Ordered logits (odds ratios) 
  
VARIABLES 
  
(1) 
Pro-poor 
(need) 
(2) 
Equality 
(equality) 
(3) 
Invest 
(utilitarian) 
(4) 
Compensate 
(desert 1) 
(5) 
Reward 
(desert 2) 
Dummy variable for monetary version (non-monetary as reference) 
Monetary 0.453*** 0.545*** 1.317 1.507* 2.233***  
(0.123) (0.127) (0.395) (0.357) (0.545) 
Dummy variables for location (Bolivia as reference) 
Tanzania 1.308* 0.0764*** 4.438*** 8.207*** 0.582  
(0.192) (0.0219) (1.573) (2.502) (0.201) 
Han China 1.244* 0.589 2.128** 5.346*** 0.246***  
(0.158) (0.242) (0.750) (1.327) (0.0923) 
Lisu and Dai China 0.809 3.494** 1.243 7.017*** 0.0759***  
(0.208) (1.818) (0.812) (3.261) (0.0351) 
Individual characteristics (no education as reference for education variables) 
Male 1.006 0.747* 1.308 1.199 0.905  
(0.243) (0.120) (0.281) (0.280) (0.178) 
Age (log) 0.780 0.707 1.864* 0.581*** 1.235  
(0.226) (0.195) (0.653) (0.114) (0.379) 
Primary education  1.577 0.649 1.575** 0.922 0.823  
(0.477) (0.274) (0.293) (0.301) (0.149) 
Secondary education  1.695 0.683 1.408 1.022 0.698  
(0.573) (0.273) (0.418) (0.371) (0.207) 
Higher education  2.557*** 0.489 1.598* 1.496 0.664  
(0.866) (0.223) (0.454) (1.020) (0.212) 
Assets count (wealth) 0.848*** 0.966 1.188** 0.909* 1.109** 
Observations 515 516 517 515 512 
Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
The ‘monetary’ variable shows the odds of selecting a given distributional principle when 
money is to be distributed against a baseline where ‘non-monetary’ forest goods are to be 
distributed. The data show that changes to this variable are significantly correlated with 
preferred fairness principle. Respondents given the monetary version are less than half as 
likely to prefer a ‘Pro-poor’ distribution of benefits compared to those with the non-monetary 
version (OR = 0.453, p<0.01). Those with the monetary version were similarly less likely to 
prefer an ‘Equality’ distributional principle (OR = 0.545, p<0.01). Compared to non-
monetary benefits, respondents were more likely to distribute monetary benefits according to 
one of the desert (deservedness) principles and, in particular, were more than twice as likely 
to prefer the principle to ‘Reward’ those who have put in the most effort (OR 2.233, p<0.01). 
Similarly, there is also rather weak evidence (only at 10% level) that people prefer the other 
desert principle of ‘Compensate’ when the monetary version is given (OR = 1.507, p< 0.10). 
It is also interesting to note that ‘Invest’ is not significantly correlated to the monetary 
version. We might summarise this as finding that non-monetary benefits composed of forest 
goods such as construction materials and fruits are more likely to be distributed in a pro-poor 
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or an egalitarian way whilst monetary benefits are more likely to be distributed according to 
meritocratic principles. To confirm this effect we ran regressions with interactive terms 
between location dummies and the variable ‘monetary’ (Supplementary materials). All of the 
interactive terms for ‘Pro-poor’ and ‘Equality’ are statistically insignificant (only one 
significant at 10%), showing that the main result is robust across the different study locations. 
Turning to our second hypothesis, the odds ratios for location variables (our indicator of 
societal difference) are expressed against the baseline of our Bolivian location. The results 
confirm that societal contexts are strongly correlated with preferred conceptions of fairness. 
Given our deliberate selection of culturally distinct locations, it is not surprising that we see 
multiple evidence of location-associated moral pluralism. Bolivian Monkox communities are 
seen to be quite distinct to other locations, with very low preference for the ‘Compensate’ 
principle compared to all other locations and low preference for the ‘Invest’ principle 
compared to Tanzania and Han China. Whilst Tanzanian village respondents display a 
comparatively high likelihood of preferring the ‘Compensate’ principle (OR = 8.207, 
p<0.01), they are much less likely to prefer ‘Equality’ (OR = 0.0764, p<0.01) and much more 
likely than Bolivians to prefer the principle to ‘Invest’ to maximise returns (OR = 4.438, 
p<0.01). Han villagers are comparatively more likely than the Monkox from Bolivia to prefer 
the ‘Invest’ (OR = 2.128, p<0.05) or ‘Compensate’ principles (OR = 5.346, p<0.01).  The 
ethnic minority Dai and Lisu villages in China reveal a distinctive profile. Compared to the 
Bolivian reference, these communities favour ‘Equality’ (OR = 3.494, p<0.05) and 
‘Compensate’ (OR = 7.017, p<0.01) principles but are unlikely to prefer the ‘Reward’ 
principle (OR = 0.0759, p<0.01). 
When we turn to the individual characteristics of our global data we see that these have a less 
prominent association with  preferred distributional fairness principles. Men are somewhat 
less likely than women to prefer ‘Equality’ of distribution (OR = 0.747, p<0.10), older people 
are less likely to prefer the ‘Compensate’ principle (OR = 0.581, p<0.01), those with higher 
levels of education significantly favour the ‘Pro-poor’ principle compared with those with no 
school education (OR = 2.557; p<0.01) and those with greater economic assets are slightly 
less likely to prefer ‘Pro-poor’ distribution (OR = 0.848, p<0.01). These correlations with  
individual characteristics are smaller and less frequent than those observed for the monetary 
and location variables. 
Factors affecting choices of procedural fairness principles 
While the results in the previous section focus on an aspect of distributional fairness, the 
principles in Table 3 represent one aspect of procedural fairness that is especially pertinent to 
distribution, regarding where primary decision-making authority resides or, in other words, 
who decides who gets what. The most striking feature of Table 3 is that there are no 
significant differences arising from the monetary/non-monetary variable. Thus, a switch from 
distributing forest benefits directly to distributing money from sales of these benefits, does 
not appear to be associated with how respondents think decisions should be made. In other 
words, while commodification of benefits is significantly correlated with preferred 
distributional fairness principles, it is not correlated with procedural fairness (at least with 
regard to the specific procedures considered here). 
Table 3: Factors affecting procedural principles: Ordered logits (odds ratios) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Page 8 of 14AUTHOR SUBMITTED MANUSCRIPT - ERL-106282.R2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60 Ac
ce
p
d M
nu
cr
pt
9 
 
VARIABLES Village 
Leader 
Village 
Assembly 
District 
Government 
Non-government 
partner 
Dummy variable for monetary version (non-monetary as reference) 
Monetary 1.307 1.083 0.788 0.787  
(0.375) (0.260) (0.297) (0.241) 
Dummy variables for location (Bolivia as reference) 
Tanzania 1.293 0.389* 0.0387*** 12.50***  
(0.483) (0.217) (0.0223) (4.380) 
Han China 2.839** 0.269** 0.374** 0.0974***  
(1.377) (0.180) (0.146) (0.0284) 
Lisu and Dai 
China 
3.189*** 0.137*** 0.386*** 0.318** 
 
(0.656) (0.0824) (0.107) (0.169) 
Individual characteristics (no school education as reference) 
Male 0.824 1.879 0.867 1.445  
(0.327) (0.822) (0.211) (0.349) 
Age (log) 1.325 0.582 1.005 0.534  
(0.284) (0.278) (0.217) (0.220) 
Primary education 0.959 1.371 0.857 1.081  
(0.393) (0.382) (0.242) (0.234) 
Secondary 
education 
0.891 1.606 0.800 1.125 
 
(0.314) (0.555) (0.228) (0.454) 
Higher education 0.663 2.553*** 0.958 2.233  
(0.298) (0.852) (0.443) (1.929) 
Assets count 
(wealth) 
0.996 1.072 1.046 0.942 
 
(0.0381) (0.0496) (0.0722) (0.0735) 
Observations 512 516 512 514 
Robust standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
By contrast, the location variables again have a robust and almost universal correlation with 
preferred principle. Lomerio (Bolivia) differs greatly from other locations across all 
principles. All other locations except Tanzania are significantly more likely to prefer 
decisions by village/community leaders than in Bolivia; all are significantly less likely to 
prefer decision making by a village assembly; all are significantly less likely to prefer district 
government authority; and all except Tanzania are significantly less likely to prefer decisions 
by a non-government partner. Tanzania is notable for a much higher preference for a non-
government decision maker (OR = 12.50, p<0.01). Both Chinese locations show a similar 
profile of differences to Bolivia, with all more likely to prefer decisions by a village leader 
and less likely to prefer any of the other principles. Han and ethnic minority (Lisu and Dai) 
Chinese villages reveal a particularly low likelihood of preferring decision-making by a non-
government partner (OR = 0.0974, p<0.01; OR = 0.318, p<0.05).  
Again, after controlling for locational and other variables, we see hardly any correlation 
attributable to individual characteristics.  Those with the highest level of education are more 
likely to prefer collective decision-making through a village assembly (OR = 2.553, p<0.01), 
but we see no significant correlation with gender, age or wealth.  
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Discussion  
Contemporary theories of human behaviour accept that preferences are not formed by self-
interest alone, but also by social morality (Graham et al., 2012) which is itself shaped by 
contextual circumstances such as culture and institutions (Graham et al., 2012, Haidt, 2013). 
In Polanyi’s analysis of The Great Transformation, norms of social responsibility and caring 
were eroded by the widespread transition from subsistence to market-based exchange 
(Polanyi, 1944). Recent research in psychology has suggested that disruption to social norms 
from exposure to monetary exchange can occur much more quickly and locally (Gneezy and 
Rustichini, 2000, Vohs et al., 2006, Vohs et al., 2008, Gino and Mogilner, 2014), with some 
studies suggesting that the mere priming of people with the idea of money induces 
preferences that benefit the rich at the expense of the poor (Caruso et al., 2013, Kouchaki et 
al., 2013). These research findings provide some cause for concern about the rapid growth in 
commodification as a putative solution for sustainability, leading us to explore the effects of 
monetisation, along with locational and individual variables, on local conceptions of fairness.  
The most interesting result of our survey is to confirm the hypothesis that a change from non-
monetary to monetary benefits from forests is associated with changing preferences for  
principles of distributional (but not procedural) fairness, a finding that is robust across the 
different research locations. The results show that when thinking about the fair way to 
distribute monetary forest revenues, respondents were less likely to prefer ‘Pro-poor’ or 
‘Equality’ as principles of distribution and more likely to prefer desert-based principles of 
‘Compensation’ and ‘Reward’.  Does this constitute an erosion of social responsibility, as 
some previous studies of commodification have found?  That would not be a safe conclusion 
for this study because all of our fairness principles were selected for being reasonable in 
some contexts at least. However, we do think that a shift away from pro-poor and pro-
equality principles for distribution might be contradictory to ambitions to pursue sustainable 
development. Poverty alleviation and equality are prominent elements of the current global 
commitment to the SDGs and our findings suggest that the shift to commodification of local 
forests is likely to induce changes in local moral preferences that could act against these. This 
association with local fairness principles is especially relevant in the context of community 
forest governance, in which decision making about benefit-sharing is at least partly devolved 
to local institutions.   
We also confirmed the hypothesis that fairness preferences are associated with locational, 
contextual factors. This has considerable implications for design of policy and project 
interventions because distributional and procedural principles considered fair in one place 
might be considered unjust in another and meet with strong latent or overt resistance. From 
what we have learned through complementary qualitative research, there are often important 
local reasons for attributing particular meanings and values to the survey principles. In 
Tanzanian sites, for example, damage caused by elephants is a huge concern to villagers and 
we think this contributes to high levels of preference for compensation. In Lomerio, Bolivia, 
we were surprised that ‘Reward’ was more favoured than in other sites because this 
ostensibly meritocratic principle does not seem to resonate with the prevailing communalism 
of the indigenous Monkox people. Here, however, we found that ‘Reward’ for those who had 
helped look after the forests was interpreted as meaning those who had struggled for the 
Monkox to gain legal rights to their forests. In effect, this refers to the elders and we think 
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this explains its cultural fit and why it is favoured. In both the Han and Dai villages surveyed 
in China, there are strong histories of communal forest management in which forest revenues 
have been successfully used to secure public goods such as roads and schools. It is likely that 
this historical experience is a key factor in the popularity of an ‘Invest’ distributional 
principle. What we are seeing then is that locational associations with distributional fairness 
preferences can arise from a variety of local material and cultural histories. Such complexity 
is also seen for procedural fairness. In Bolivia, the comparative dislike for decisions by 
village leaders alone is almost certainly linked to quite fundamental cultural preference for 
communalism over individualism. By contrast, the comparatively strong appeal of non-
government partner decision-making in Tanzania is likely to be more circumstantial, arising 
from the presence of a non-governmental organisation (the Mpingo Conservation and 
Development Initiative) that is highly active in local forest governance initiatives. In the Han 
Chinese village, the most active non-government partners are private sector forestry 
companies, again providing a more circumstantial explanation of preferences. 
Finally, we were surprised to find so little evidence that individual characteristics such as age 
and gender are associated with fairness preferences. We do not yet understand the reasons for 
this but suspect it relates to the specific focus of our study, i.e. that these factors are less 
important in determining conceptions of fairness related to forest goods and related revenues. 
Regarding age, it should also be noted that all respondents were adults and we may therefore 
have missed important differences across adolescence that has been observed in previous 
experimental studies (Almås et al., 2010). 
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